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Abstract
In this paper we address two different problems related with the factoriza-
tion of an RSA module N . First we can show that factoring is equivalent in
deterministic polynomial time to counting points on a pair of twisted Elliptic
curves modulo N . Also we settle the malleability of factoring an RSA module,
as described in [9], using the number of points of a single elliptic curve modulo
N , and Coppersmith’s algorithm.
1 Introduction
The motivation of this note is twofolded. First we address the problem of malleabil-
ity of an RSA module N and, from there, the equivalence between factoring and
counting the number of points on an elliptic curve modulo N .
Malleability started in the paper by Pailler and Villar [9], while studying the
existence of a tradeoff between one-wayness and chosen ciphertext security, already
observed back to the eighties for example in [10, 12, 6]. In some sense, one cannot
achieve one-way encryption with a level of security equivalent to solve certain difficult
problem, at the same time as the cryptosystem being IND-CCA secure with respect
to it.
Even though this paradox has been observed, it has not been formally proved
except in the case of factoring-based cryptosystems in which Pailler and Villar [9]
clarified the question reformulating the paradox in terms of key preserving black-
box reductions and proved that if factoring can be reduced in the standard model
to breaking one-wayness of the cryptosystem then it is impossible to achieve chosen-
cyphertext security.
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After this they introduce the notion of malleability of a key generator and, with
it, they are able to extend the result from key preserving black box reductions to
the case of arbitrary black box reductions. This notion, which we give explicitly in
Section 3, captures a very basic fact in arithmetic: intuitively, one tends to believe
that the problem of factoring a given number n (an RSA modulus) is not made
easier if we know how to factor other numbers n′ relatively prime to n. If this is
true we say that factoring is non-malleable.
As the authors themselves stress in [9], it is very important to study non-
malleability of key generators and, in fact, they conjecture that most instance gen-
erators are non-malleable, although no arguments are given to support this belief.
In [4] we address this question and notice that the freedom of selecting the
new number n′ breaks the independent behaviour of prime numbers, and hence we
produce an explicit n′ which makes factorization malleable. In other words, given
any RSA modulus n we prove the existence of a polynomial time reduction algorithm
from factoring n to factoring certain explicit numbers n′, all relatively prime to n.
The numbers given in [4] are very simple: given the RSA modulus n = pq, the
factorization of n′ = mn − 1, where m is a primitive root of the smallest prime
dividing n, allows us to factor n in polynomial time. However, this does not give a
complete satisfactory answer for several reasons. First one could think of n′ to be of
exponential size and then out of the scope of the question. However, as we mention
in [4], one can think of n′ as a collection of exactly n ones when it is written in
m-ary, and we just need the factors of n′ modulo n, a data that has the same size as
the given number. In any case, it still persists the restlessness of knowing whether
or not in an small interval centered in n we can find an explicit n′ which can help
to factor n.
In this paper we address this question, given an affirmative answer to the mal-
leability of the problem of factoring by showing a number of the same size of N
whose factorization allows us to factor N with a algorithm that runs in polynomial
time.
The notion of malleability rests in measuring the difference between suitable
Game 0 and Game 1 as defined in [9], more precisely: if we compare the success
probability of factoring N with an Oracle which can solve any problem that can be
reduced to factoring (Game 0) with the one when using an Oracle having the extra
ability of factoring numbers which are relatively prime toN (Game 1) the probability
of factoring N increases significantly (see [9], Section 4.1, for more details).
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Concretely we will prove that given a random elliptic curve E defined modulo
N , where N is an RSA module, and assuming that its number of points EN is
known, by further knowing the factorization of EN we can produce a deterministic
polynomial time algorithm that factors N . The key tool in our proof will be the
result of Coppersmith (see [2]) that allows to factor an integer by knowing only
certain bits of one of its prime factors. It is worth remarking that it is not known
how to factor N only with the number EN as input.
While proving this statement another interesting problem treated widely in the
literature, (see [8] and [7] for related results) showed up:
Problem Is factoring N equivalent to counting the number of points of elliptic
curves modulo N .?
We were lucky and we could also give a definite answer by proving the following
theorem:
Theorem 1 Given the number of points, affine or projective, of any elliptic curve
and one of its twists modulo N we can factor N in deterministic polynomial time.
Remark 2 As we said this problem has been addressed in [7]. We should stress
that their results are based in an assumption on the distribution of the number of
points on elliptic curves over finite fields which is not accurate. But more than that,
the reduction algorithm from counting the number of the elliptic curve modulo N to
factoring N in their case is probabilistic while here it is proved to be deterministic.
Moreover, in terms of malleability, what we do in Section 3 involves taking a single
elliptic curve, and suceeds with probability 1, while the results in [7] need to consider
many elliptic curves to have positive probability to factor N . Finally the method used
in that paper only works for the number of projective points on the elliptic curve,
not covering the affine case as we do.
The structure of the paper goes as follows: In Section 2 we prove Theorem 1,
while Section 3 is dedicated to the problem of malleability of factoring.
2 Factorization
Let N ∈ Z. Given an elliptic curve E := {y2 = x3 + ax+ b} over Z/NZ, we will
denote by Ed its quadratic twist E := {dy2 = x3 + ax + b}. E(Z/NZ) will be the
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number of points of E (mod N), and E(Z/NZ)∗ the number of affine points of the
curve (mod N). We know that if N = pq, then E(Z/NZ) = E(Z/pZ)×E(Z/qZ),
and that for any prime l, E(Z/lZ) = l+1−al, where al is the trace of the Frobenius
endomorphism of E (mod l).
Let N = pq be an RSA modulus, and d an integer such that
(
d
p
)
= −1 or
(
d
q
)
= −1.
We will use the abuse of notation E = E(Z/NZ) (or E = E(Z/NZ)∗), given by
E = (P − ap)(Q− aq) = PQ− Paq −Qap + apaq,
where P = p + 1, Q = q + 1 in the projective case and P = p,Q = q in the affine
case.
There are three options for Ed(Z/NZ) (or Ed(Z/NZ)
∗), which will be denoted
by Eˆ, E˜, E¯ respectively, depending on the Legendre simbols
(
d
p
)
and
(
d
q
)
,
Eˆ = (P + ap)(Q+ aq) = PQ+ Paq +Qap + apaq,
E˜ = (P − ap)(Q + aq) = PQ+ Paq −Qap − apaq,
E¯ = (P + ap)(Q− aq) = PQ− Paq +Qap − apaq.
Then,
E + Eˆ + E˜ + E¯ = 4PQ, (1)
while
4PQ =
(E + E˜)(E + E¯)
E
= E + E˜ + E¯ +
(E˜E¯)
E
= 4PQ− Eˆ + (E˜E¯)
E
,
so
EEˆ = E˜E¯. (2)
Lemma 3 Knowing two among E˜, Eˆ, E¯ and E, we know the four of them.
Proof. We split the proof in 2 cases.
Case 1. We suppose E and Eˆ are known. The case in which E˜ and E¯ are known
is analogous. Then we compute its product, M = EEˆ and its sum L = E + Eˆ, and
we have
E˜E¯ = M
E˜ + E¯ = 4PQ− L
so E˜ and E¯ are the solutions of the quadratic polynomial X2 − (4PQ− L)X +M.
E˜ =
4PQ− L+√(4PQ− L)2 − 4M
2
, E¯ =
4PQ− L−√(4PQ− L)2 − 4M
2
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Case 2. Suppose E and E˜ are known. The cases in which the pairs (E, E¯), (Eˆ, E˜)
and (Eˆ, E¯) are known, are analogous. Then, compute the quotient E
E˜
=M and the
sum E + E˜ = L. Hence, E¯
Eˆ
=M , or E¯ =MEˆ, and by (1) (M +1)Eˆ = 4PQ−L, or
Eˆ =
4PQ− L
(M + 1)
, E¯ =
M(4PQ− L)
(M + 1)
.
Theorem 4 Knowing either E(Z/NZ) and Ed(Z/NZ) or E(Z/NZ)
∗ and Ed(Z/NZ)
∗
for
(
d
p
)
= −1, we can factor N in polynomial time.
In the projective case, we compute the four integers E, Eˆ, E˜, E¯ by Lemma 3 and
then its sum to compute PQ. With PQ and N we factor N .
In the affine case, we again compute the four integers E, Eˆ, E˜, E¯, and then note
that E + E˜ = 2q(p− ap), has q as a common factor with N , so computing the gcd
with N , we factor N .
In both cases observe that, in principle, we do not know which one is Ed(Z/NZ),
so we will have to make two computations.
Theorem 5 Under ERH factoring an RSA modulus N = pq is polynomial time
equivalent to count the number of points, affine or projective, of any elliptic curve
E modulo N .
Proof. Let E be an elliptic curve. Then, knowing the factorization of N , we
can compute EN by Schoof’s algorithm [11].
Now suppose we know EN . from [1], we know that, under ERH, the smallest
quadratic nonresidue modulo p, call it d, is of size O((log p)2). Hence, apply the
previous Theorem 4 to the pair E,Ed.
Recall that, as of today, we can compute the number of points modulo N by
baby step giant step, since E (mod N) has group structure, in O(N1/4+ε) which is
exponential.
3 Malleability
As in previous sections, let N = pq be an RSA module. We recall that in order to
prove that factoring is malleable we need to find a number relatively prime to N
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and of the same size, which factorization will allow us to factor N in deterministic
polynomial time. We consider a random elliptic curve E (mod N), and we let EN
be the number of affine points, while E∗N will be the number of points including
the points at infinity. We can assume that we have at our disposal an Oracle that
computes any of these two numbers. Since this computation can be reduced to the
factorization of N thanks to Schoof’s algorithm, this corresponds to Game 0 in the
setup described in the introduction while defining malleability. Note also that, as
we have already observed, there is no known polynomial time algorithm that can
factor N using this information.
Assume now that we have access to an auxiliary Oracle that can factor any
number relatively prime to N . Using it, we factor the number EN (or E
∗
N) and we
will show in the following theorem that from this we can factor N in polynomial
time, thus concluding that Game 1 has solved the factorization problem that was not
achieved by Game 0, which shows that factorization of RSA modules is malleable.
Theorem 6 Given N = pq where p, q are prime numbers, and an elliptic curve E
(mod N), there exists a polynomial time algorithm in logN such that with input
N and the factorization of EN or E
∗
N , it outputs the factors of N , p and q with
probability one.
Proof. As we mentioned in the introduction, we will use a well known result of
Copersmith, which allows us to find a factor of an integer by just knowing certain
part of its highest bits. For convenience we include this result now
Theorem 7 (Coppersmith) If we know an integer N = pq and we know the high
order (1/4)(log2N bits of p, then in timee polynomial in logN we ran discover p and
q.
Observe that it would be sufficient by knowing (1/4)(log2N −O(log logN , since
we could try the unknown bits up to (1/4)(log2N one by one in polynomial time.
Now, recall again that, by Hasse’s theorem the factor found q − aq + 1 is at
distance |aq − 1| ≤ 2√q + 1 ≤ 2N1/4 + 1 of q which is a factor of N . By bounding
the distance, we know certain of the highest bits of q from those of q − aq + 1.
In particular, let us suppose that two integers x < y are at distance y−x = 2t+R
where R < 2t. We can write x = Mx2
t +Rx, y = My2
t +Ry with Rx < 2
t, Ry < 2
t
and −2t < Ry − Rx < 2t. Then, y − x = (My − Mx)2t + Ry − Rx, which gives
My = Mx+1 or My =Mx+2 and, hence, from the highest bits of y up to t of x we
know those of y and viceversa.
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In our case, the distance is bounded by 2q1/2 so we know up to t = [log2 q/2]+ 1
of the highest bits of q. By division, we also know up to t of the highest bits of p.
But
√
N ≤ p = Mp2t + Rp ≤ (Mp + 1)2t, and so Mp ≥
√
N/(2t + 1) ≥ N1/4 and,
hence, we can apply Coppersmith algorithm to find p, thus factoring N .
Let us stress that having factored the number E∗N , from the average of the divisor
function ∑
n≤x
d(n) = x log x+ (2γ − 1)x+ o(x)
we deduce that, with probability 1, the number of factors of an integer is of the
order of the logarithm of it. Hence, once the auxiliary Oracle gives the factors of
EN , we will apply Coppersmith one by one finding q in polynomial time in log N .
Remark 8 The case in which EN is given, is similar and we leave the details to
the reader.
3.1 Small difference
Even though malleability is fully proved in the last section, we include this section
as a small remark in the negligibale case in which EN and E
∗
N have an exponential
number of divisors, but the two prime factors p, q are not too far from each other.
In order to construct a module RSA we tipically search for a couple of prime
factors of the same number of bits, i.e. q < p < 2q. However, if the two primes are
very close to each other, the scheme is easy to break since the module can be factored
in polynomial time. Indeed, It is well known that if ∆ = |p − q| < N1/4 Fermat’s
factorization algorithm enables to find both factors of N in polynomial time and
there has been an effort of the community to improve the exponent 1/4 in ∆ for the
factorization of N . It is worth to mention that if the objective is breaking the RSA
scheme, rather than factoring the modulus, then the exponent can be increased all
the way up to basically 1 by means of an improved version of the attacks done by
Wiener or Boneh and Durfee, (see [3]). However, for the factorization of N not too
much more is known. In [5] the authors claim in an apparently unpublished work
that are able to factor an RSA module N = pq even when the difference is of order
|p− q| < N1/3.
We devote this section to recover ∆ < N1/3 using malleability techniques: in
particular the factorization of the number of points of a random elliptic curve mod-
ulo N , together with a simple application of an argument of elementary geometry
attributed to Heron of Alexandria which says that in any triangle, the product of
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the length of its three sides equals four times the area times the radius of the cir-
cumscribed circle. We will assume from now that ∆ = |p − q| < c′N1/3 for some
suitable constant c′.
In our case given three points (x0, y0), (x1, y1), (x2, y2) of integer coordinates in
the hyperbola xy = E∗N , we see that the radius of the circumscribed circle is
R =
((x0x1)
2 + (E∗N)
2)((x0x2)
2 + (E∗N )
2)((x2x1)
2 + (E∗N )
2)
4(E∗N)
2(x0x1x2)2
,
and taking max{x0, x1, x2} ≤
√
E∗N , we get
R ≥ E
∗
N
4
.
On the other hand, by Hasse’s theorem
E∗N ≥ (
√
p− 1)2(√q − 1)2
and
(
√
p− 1)(√q − 1) =
√
N −√p−√q + 1 ≥
√
N/4,
for N sufficiently large, and so
R ≥ N
64
.
Hence, by Heron of Alexandria’s theorem, in an arc of the hyperbola xy = E∗N of
lenght less than (N/32)1/3 we can only have two points of integer coordinates.
Now recall that the lenght L of an arc of the hyperbola xy = T with a ≤ x ≤ b
is given by
L =
∫ b
a
√
1 +
T 2
t4
dt ≤
∫ b
a
1 +
T 2
t4
dt = (b− a) + T
2
3
(
1
a3
− 1
b3
)
=
= (b− a) + (b− a)T
2
3
(
b2 + ab+ a2
(ab)3
)
≤ (b− a) + (b− a)T
2
a3b
.
Consider T = E∗N , b ≥ N1/2 and b− a ≤ cN1/3 for suitable c. Hence, by noting that
E∗N ≤ (
√
p+ 1)2(
√
q + 1)2 = (
√
N +
√
p+
√
q + 1) ≤ N + 7N3/4,
since the primes are very close, we get from a simple computation that the arc on
the hyperbola has lenght
L ≤ 3cN1/3,
In particular, we can select c small enought so L ≤ (N/32)1/3 and hence it can only
have at most two points of integral coordinates. Hence we can ask the auxiliary
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Oracle to factor E∗N and output the at most two factors of it lying in the interval
[a, b]. This Oracle will give back the factor a ≤ N1/2−c′N1/3 ≤ q−aq+1 ≤ N1/2 ≤ b,
for aq ≥ 0 or a ≤ N1/2 ≤ q − aq + 1 ≤ N1/2 + c′N1/3 ≤ b if aq ≤ 0 for some c′ ≤ c.
In practice c = 1
3(32)1/3
and c′ = 1
6(32)1/3
are enough. Using it we can factor N with
Coppersmith’s algorithm, as we did in the previous subsection.
Remark 9 Again the case in which EN is given, is similar and we leave the details
to the reader.
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